Average-Case Analysis of Iterative Voting
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of iterative plurality on the welfare of the chosen outcome at equilibrium, relative to the truthful vote profile, via an adaptation of the price of anarchy. However, prior analyses have only studied the worst- and average-case performances when agents' preferences are distributed by the impartial culture. This work extends average-case analysis to a wider class of distributions and distinguishes when iterative plurality improves or degrades asymptotic welfare.
PDF AbstractTasks
Datasets
Add Datasets
introduced or used in this paper
Results from the Paper
Submit
results from this paper
to get state-of-the-art GitHub badges and help the
community compare results to other papers.
Methods
No methods listed for this paper. Add
relevant methods here
