Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We show that such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concave.
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