no code implementations • 14 Nov 2023 • Adharsh Kamath, Aditya Senthilnathan, Saikat Chakraborty, Pantazis Deligiannis, Shuvendu K. Lahiri, Akash Lal, Aseem Rastogi, Subhajit Roy, Rahul Sharma
Finally, we explore the effectiveness of using an efficient combination of a symbolic tool and an LLM on our dataset and compare it against a purely symbolic baseline.
1 code implementation • 13 Oct 2023 • Saikat Chakraborty, Shuvendu K. Lahiri, Sarah Fakhoury, Madanlal Musuvathi, Akash Lal, Aseem Rastogi, Aditya Senthilnathan, Rahul Sharma, Nikhil Swamy
In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3. 5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants.
1 code implementation • 10 May 2021 • Deevashwer Rathee, Mayank Rathee, Rahul Kranti Kiran Goli, Divya Gupta, Rahul Sharma, Nishanth Chandran, Aseem Rastogi
Although prior work on secure 2-party inference provides specialized protocols for convolutional neural networks (CNNs), existing secure implementations of these math operators rely on generic 2-party computation (2PC) protocols that suffer from high communication.
1 code implementation • 9 Dec 2020 • Javier Alvarez-Valle, Pratik Bhatu, Nishanth Chandran, Divya Gupta, Aditya Nori, Aseem Rastogi, Mayank Rathee, Rahul Sharma, Shubham Ugare
Our first component is an end-to-end compiler from TensorFlow to a variety of MPC protocols.
Cryptography and Security
1 code implementation • 13 Oct 2020 • Deevashwer Rathee, Mayank Rathee, Nishant Kumar, Nishanth Chandran, Divya Gupta, Aseem Rastogi, Rahul Sharma
We present CrypTFlow2, a cryptographic framework for secure inference over realistic Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) using secure 2-party computation.
4 code implementations • 16 Sep 2019 • Nishant Kumar, Mayank Rathee, Nishanth Chandran, Divya Gupta, Aseem Rastogi, Rahul Sharma
Finally, to provide malicious secure MPC protocols, our third component, Aramis, is a novel technique that uses hardware with integrity guarantees to convert any semi-honest MPC protocol into an MPC protocol that provides malicious security.
no code implementations • 8 Jul 2017 • Danel Ahman, Cédric Fournet, Catalin Hritcu, Kenji Maillard, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy
We provide a way to ease the verification of programs whose state evolves monotonically.
Programming Languages Cryptography and Security
4 code implementations • 28 Feb 2017 • Jonathan Protzenko, Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué, Aseem Rastogi, Tahina Ramananandro, Peng Wang, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Catalin Hritcu, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cédric Fournet, Nikhil Swamy
Low* is a shallow embedding of a small, sequential, well-behaved subset of C in F*, a dependently-typed variant of ML aimed at program verification.
Programming Languages Cryptography and Security