no code implementations • 11 Jan 2023 • Sylvain Bouveret, Hugo Gilbert, Jérôme Lang, Guillaume Méroué
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence).
no code implementations • 14 Feb 2022 • Virginie Do, Matthieu Hervouin, Jérôme Lang, Piotr Skowron
Assume $k$ candidates need to be selected.
1 code implementation • 17 Jan 2022 • Tahar Allouche, Jérôme Lang, Florian Yger
Epistemic voting interprets votes as noisy signals about a ground truth.
1 code implementation • 7 Dec 2021 • Tahar Allouche, Jérôme Lang, Florian Yger
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it.
no code implementations • 19 May 2021 • Virginie Do, Jamal Atif, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Usunier
Citizens' assemblies need to represent subpopulations according to their proportions in the general population.
no code implementations • 14 Feb 2018 • Isabelle Bloch, Jérôme Lang, Ramón Pino Pérez, Carlos Uzcátegui
Several tasks in artificial intelligence require to be able to find models about knowledge dynamics.
no code implementations • 25 Jul 2017 • Jérôme Lang
This volume consists of papers presented at the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK) held at the University of Liverpool, UK, from July 24 to 26, 2017.
no code implementations • 22 Apr 2016 • Jérôme Lang, Marija Slavkovik, Srdjan Vesic
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in the same agenda.
no code implementations • 23 Sep 2015 • Haris Aziz, Paul Harrenstein, Jérôme Lang, Michael Wooldridge
The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory.
no code implementations • 7 Jun 2013 • Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Maria Polukarov, Alice Cohen-Hadria
For four candidates, the message is, roughly, that most scoring rules (with the exception of Borda) do not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium but that Condorcet-consistent rules, for an odd number of voters, do.