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Found 5 papers, 2 papers with code
Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations
In this work, we study how the two mechanisms interact.
Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation.
Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information.
Assortative clustering in a one-dimensional population with replication strategies
We find that the system is more densely populated in an unfavorable environment than in a favorable one because only the latter has to pay the cost of conflict.
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance.
