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Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice
Inferring applicant preferences is fundamental in many analyses of school-choice data.
Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior.
Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed.
Identification and Estimation in Many-to-one Two-sided Matching without Transfers
Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions.
